We prove two theorems saying that no distributed system in which processes coordinate using reliable registers and -resilient 
Introduction
We consider distributed systems consisting of asynchronously operating processes that coordinate using reliable multi-writer multi-reader registers and shared services. A service is a distributed computing mechanism that interacts with distributed processes, accepting invocations, performing internal computation steps, and delivering responses. Examples of services include:
Shared atomic (linearizable) objects, defined by sequential type specifications [12, 15] , for example, atomic read-modify-write, queue, counter, test&set, and compare&swap objects. The consensus problem can also be defined as an atomic object.
Concurrently-accessible data structures such as balanced trees.
Broadcast services such as totally ordered broadcast [11] .
Failure detectors, which provide processes with hints about the failure of other processes [6] . 1 Thus, our notion of a service is quite general. We define three successively more general classes of serviceatomic objects, failure-oblivious services, and general (possibly failure-aware) services-in Sections 2, 6, and 7. We define our services to tolerate a certain number of failures: a service is -resilient if it is guaranteed to operate as long as no more than of the processes connected to it fail.
A fundamental, general question in distributed computing theory is: "What problems can be solved by distributed systems, with what levels of resilience, using services of given types and levels of resilience?" In this paper, we expose a basic limitation on the achievable resilience, namely, that the resilience of a system cannot be "boosted" above that of its services. More specifically, we prove two theorems saying that no distributed system in which processes coordinate using reliable registers and -resilient services can solve the consensus problem in the presence of · ½ process stopping failures.
We focus on the consensus problem because it has been shown to be fundamental to the study of resilience in distributed systems. For example, Herlihy has shown that con-sensus is universal [12] : an atomic object of any sequential type can be implemented in a wait-free manner (i.e., tolerating any number of failures), using wait-free consensus objects.
Our first main theorem, Theorem 1, assumes that the given services are atomic objects and allows any connection pattern between processes and services. The result is a strict generalization of the classical impossibility result of Fischer et al. [9] for fault-tolerant consensus. Our simple, self-contained impossibility proof is based on a bivalence argument similar to the one in [9] . The proof involves showing that decisions can be made in a particular way, described by a hook pattern of executions.
In contrast to the impossibility of boosting for consensus, we show that it is possible to boost the resilience of systems solving problems easier than consensus. In particular, we show that the -set consensus problem [7] is solvable for ¾ ½ failures using ½-resilient consensus services. Theorem 1 and its proof assume that the given services are atomic objects; however, they extend to the larger class of failure-oblivious services. A failure-oblivious service generalizes an atomic object by allowing an invocation to trigger multiple processing steps instead of just one, and to trigger any number of responses, at any endpoints. The service may also include background processing tasks, not related to any specific endpoint. The key constraint is that no step may depend on explicit knowledge of failure events. We define the class of failure-oblivious services, give examples (e.g., totally-ordered broadcast), and describe how Theorem 1 can be extended to such services.
Our second main theorem, Theorem 11, addresses the case where the system may contain failure-aware services (e.g., failure detectors), in addition to failure-oblivious services and reliable registers. This result also says that boosting is impossible. However, it requires the additional assumption that each failure-aware service is connected to all processes; thus, · ½ process failures overall can disable all the failure-aware services. The proof is an extension of the first proof, using the same "hook" construction. We also show that the stronger connectivity assumption is necessary, by demonstrating that it is possible to boost the resilience of a system solving consensus if arbitrary connection patterns are allowed between processes and failure-aware services: specifically, consensus is solvable for any number of failures using only ½-resilient ¾-process perfect failure detectors. The proofs of all results are available in the full version of the paper [1] .
Related work. Our Theorem 1, for atomic services, can be derived by carefully combining several earlier theorems, including Herlihy's result on universality of consensus [12] , and the result of Chandra et al. on -resiliency vs. waitfreedom [4] . However, this argument does not extend to prove impossibility of boosting for failure-oblivious and failure-aware services. Moreover, some of the proofs upon which this alternative proof rests are themselves more complex than our direct proof.
Theorem 1 appeared first in a technical report [2] . Subsequent impossibility results for atomic objects appeared in [10, 16] . Our models for failure-oblivious services and general services are new. As far as we know, this is the first time a unified framework has been used to express atomic and non-atomic objects. Moreover, this is the first time boosting analysis has been performed for services more general than atomic objects.
Organization. Section 2 presents definitions for the underlying model of concurrent computation and for atomic objects. Section 3 presents our model for a system whose services are atomic objects. Section 4 presents the first impossibility result. Section 5 shows that boosting is possible for set consensus. Section 6 defines failure-oblivious services, gives an example, and extends the first impossibility result to systems with failure-oblivious services. Section 7 defines general services, gives examples, and presents our second main impossibility result. Section 8 shows how to model some important services in our framework, and Section 9 concludes.
Mathematical Preliminaries

Model of concurrent computation
We use the I/O automaton model [17, chapter 8] 
Sequential types
We define the notion of a "sequential type", in order to describe allowable sequential behavior of atomic services. The definition used here generalizes the one in [17, We allow nondeterminism in our definition of a sequential type in order to make our notion of "service" as general as possible. In particular, the problem of -set-consensus can be specified using a nondeterministic sequential type. 
Example
Thus, the first values are remembered, and every operation returns one of these values.
Canonical -resilient atomic objects
A "canonical -resilient atomic object" describes the allowable concurrent behavior of atomic objects. Namely, we define the canonical -resilient atomic object of type Ì for endpoint set Â and index , wherē Ì is a sequential type, Â is a finite set of endpoints at which invocations and responses may occur, ¾ AE is the level of resilience, and¯ is a unique index (name) for the service.
The object is described as an I/O automaton, in Figure 1 The parameter Â allows different objects to be connected to the same or different sets of processes. A process at endpoint ¾ Â can issue any invocation specified by the underlying sequential type and can (potentially) receive any allowable response. We allow concurrent (overlapping) operations, at the same or different endpoints. The object preserves the order of concurrent invocations at the same endpoint by keeping the invocations and responses in internal FIFO buffers, two per endpoint (one for invocations from the endpoint, the other for responses to the endpoint). The object chooses the result of an operation nondeterministically, from the set of results allowed by the transition relation Ì AE applied to the invocation and the current value of val. The object can exhibit nondeterminism due to nondeterminism of sequential type Ì , and due to interleavings of steps for different invocations.
We model a failure at an endpoint by an explicit input action Ð . We use the task structure of I/O automata and the basic definition of fair executions to specify the required resilience: For every process ¾ Â, we assume the service has two tasks, which we call the -perform task and -output task. The -perform task includes the Ô Ö ÓÖÑ action, which carries out operations invoked at endpoint . Theoutput task includes all the actions giving responses at . In addition, every -* task (£ is perform or output) contains a special ÙÑÑÝ £ action, which is enabled when either process has failed or more than processes in Â have failed. The ÙÑÑÝ £ action is intended to allow, but not force, the service to stop performing steps on behalf of process after fails or after the resilience level has been exceeded.
The definition of fairness for I/O automata says that each task must get infinitely many turns to take steps. In this context, this implies that, for every ¾ Â, the object eventually responds to an outstanding invocation at , unless either fails or more than processes in Â fail. If does fail or more than processes in Â fail, the fairness definition allows the object to perform the ÙÑÑÝ £ action every time the £ task gets a turn, which permits the object to avoid responding to . In particular, if more than processes fail, the object may avoid responding to any process in Â, since ÙÑÑÝ ÓÙÔÙØ is enabled for all ¾ Â. Also, if all processes connected to the service (i.e., all processes in Â) fail, the object may avoid responding to any process.
Thus, the basic fairness definition expresses the idea that the object is -resilient: Once more than of the processes connected to the object fail, the object itself may "fail" by becoming silent. However, although the object may stop responding, it never violates its safety guarantees, that is, it never returns values inconsistent with the underlying sequential type specification. A canonical atomic object whose sequential type is read/write is called a canonical register. In this paper, we will consider canonical reliable (wait-free) registers.
-resilient atomic objects
An I/O automaton is an -resilient atomic object of type Ì for endpoint set Â and index , provided that it implements the canonical -resilient atomic object Ë of type Ì for Â and , in the following sense:
1. and Ë have the same input actions (including Ð actions) and the same output actions. 
System Model with Atomic Objects
Our system model consists of a collection of process automata, reliable registers, and fault-prone atomic objects (which we sometimes refer to as services). For this section, we fix Á, Ã, and Ê, finite (disjoint) index sets for processes, services, and registers, respectively, and Ì , a sequential type, representing the problem the system is intended to solve. A distributed system for Á Ã Ê and Ì is the composition of the following I/O automata (see [17, chapter 8] ):
Services (atomic objects) Ë , ¾ Ã. We let Ì denote the sequential type, and Â Á the set of endpoints, of service Ë . We assume itself is the index.
3. Registers Ë Ö , Ö ¾ Ê. We let Î Ö denote the value set and Ú ¼ Ö the initial value for register Ë Ö . We assume Ö is the index.
Processes interact only via services and registers. Process È can invoke an operation on service Ë provided that ¾ Â . Process È can also invoke a read or write operation on register Ë Ö provided that ¾ Â Ö . Services and registers do not communicate directly with one another, but may interact indirectly via processes. In the remainder of this section, we describe the components in more detail and define terminology needed for the results and proofs.
Processes
We assume that process È , ¾ Á has the following inputs and outputs:
Inputs , ¾ Ì invs, and outputs , ¾ Ì resps. These represent È 's interactions with the external world.
For every service Ë such that ¾ Â , outputs , ¾ Ì invs, and inputs , ¾ Ì resps.
For every register Ë Ö , outputs Ö , where is a read or write invocation of Ë Ö , and inputs Ö , where is a response of Ë Ö .
¯Input Ð .
È may issue several invocations, on the same or different services or registers, without waiting for responses to previous invocations. The external world at È may also issue several invocations to È without waiting for responses. As a technicality, we assume that when È performs a decide(Ú) output action, it records the decision value Ú in a special state component. We assume that È has only a single task, which therefore consists of all the locally-controlled actions of È . We assume that in every state, some action in that single task is enabled. We assume that the Ð input action affects È in such a way that, from that point onward, no output actions are enabled. However, other locally-controlled actions may be enabled-in fact, by the restriction just above, some such action must be enabled. This action might be a "dummy" action, as in the canonical resilient atomic objects defined in Section 2.3.
The complete system
The complete system is constructed by composing the È Ë , and Ë Ö automata and then hiding all the actions used to communicate among them.
For any action of , we define the participants of action to be the set of automata with in their signature. Note that no two distinct registers or services participate in the same action , and similarly no two distinct processes participate in the same action. Furthermore, for any action , the number of participants is at most ¾. Thus, if an action has two participants, they must be a process and either a service or register.
As we defined earlier, each process È has a single . These tasks define a partition of the set of all actions in the system, except for the inputs of the process automata that are not outputs of any other automata, namely, the invocations by the external world and the Ð actions. The I/O automata fairness assumptions imply that each of these tasks get infinitely many turns to execute. We say that a task is applicable to a finite execution « iff some action of is enabled in the last state of «.
The consensus problem
The "traditional" specification of -resilient binary consensus is given in terms of a set È ¾ Á of processes, each of which starts with some value Ú in ¼ ½ . Processes are subject to stopping failures, which prevent them from producing any further output. 2 Validity Any value decided on is the initial value of some process.
Termination In every fair execution in which at most processes fail, all nonfaulty processes eventually decide.
In this paper, we specify the consensus problem differently:
We say that a distributed system Ë solves -resilient consensus for Á if and only if Ë is an -resilient atomic object of type consensus (Section 2.2) for endpoint set Á. We argue that any system that satisfies our definition satisfies a slight variant of the traditional one. In this variant, inputs arrive explicitly via init´µ actions, not all nonfaulty processes need receive inputs, and only nonfaulty processes that do receive inputs are guaranteed to eventually decide. Our agreement and validity conditions are the same as before; our new termination condition is:
Termination In every fair execution in which at most processes fail, any nonfaulty process that receives an input eventually decides.
Impossibility of Boosting for Atomic Objects
Our first main theorem is: To prove Theorem 1, we assume that such an implementation exists and derive a contradiction. Let denote the complete system, that is, the composition of the processes È , ¾ Á, services Ë , ¾ Ã, and registers Ë Ö , Ö ¾ Ê. By assumption, satisfies the agreement, validity and termination properties of consensus.
For each component ¾ Ã Ê and ¾ Â (recall that Â denotes the endpoints of ) let inv-buffer´ µ denote the invocation buffer of , which stores invocations from È , and let resp-buffer´ µ denote the response buffer of , which stores responses to È . Also let Ù« Ö´ µ inv-buffer´ µ resp-buffer´ µ .
Assumption
To prove Theorem 1, we make the following assumption: (i) We assume that the processes È , ¾ Á, are deterministic automata, as defined in Section 2.1. For services, we assume a slightly weaker condition: that the sequential type is deterministic, i.e, the sequential type has a unique initial value and the transition relation AE is a mapping. Note that the sequential type for registers is also deterministic, by definition. Assumption (i) implies that any failure-free execution can be defined by applying a sequence of tasks, one after the other, to the initial state of . Assumption (i) does not reduce the generality of our impossibility result, because any candidate system could be restricted to satisfy (i); if the impossibility result holds for the restricted automaton, then it also holds for the original one.
Lemma 2 Let « be any finite failure-free execution of , be any task of applicable to «, and «¡¬ be any failure-free extension of « such that ¬ includes no actions of . Then is applicable to « ¡ ¬.
Let × be any state of arising after a finite failurefree execution « of , and let be a task that is applicable to « (equivalently, enabled in ×). Then we write participants´ ×µ for the set of participants of action Ø ÓÒ´ ×µ. Note that, for any task and any state ×, participants´ ×µ ¾. Also, if participants´ ×µ ¾, then participants´ ×µ is of the form È Ë , for some ¾ Á and ¾ Ã Ê.
Initializations and valence
In our proof, we consider executions in which consensus inputs arrive from the external world at the beginning of the execution. Thus, we define an initialization of to be a finite execution of containing exactly one init´µ action for each ¾ Á, and no other actions. An execution « of is input-first if it has an initialization as a prefix, and contains no other init´µ actions. A finite failure-free input-first execution « is defined to be ¼-valent if (1) some failure-free extension of « contains a decide(¼) action, for some ¾ Á, and (2) no failure-free extension of « contains a decide(½) action, for any ¾ Á. The definition of a ½-valent execution is symmetric. A finite failure-free input-first execution « is univalent if it is either ¼-valent or ½-valent. A finite failure-free input-first execution « is bivalent if (1) some failure-free extension of « contains a decide(¼) action, for some , and (2) some failure-free extension of « contains a decide(½) action, for some . These definitions immediately imply the following result:
Lemma 3 Every finite failure-free input-first execution of is either bivalent or univalent.
The following lemma provides the first step of the impossibility proof:
Lemma 4 has a bivalent initialization.
For the rest of this section, fix « to be any particular bivalent initialization of .
The graph ´ µ
Now define an edge-labeled directed graph ´ µ as follows:
(1) The vertices of ´ µ are the finite failure-free input-first extensions of the bivalent initialization « . By assumption (i) of Section 4.1, any task triggers at most one transition after a failure-free execution «. Therefore, for any vertex « of ´ µ and any task , there is at most one edge labeled with outgoing from «.
The existence of a hook
We show that decisions in can be made in a particular way, described by a hook pattern of executions. Similarly to [5] , we define a hook to be a subgraph of ´ µ of the form depicted in Figure 2 .
Lemma 5 ´ µ contains a hook.
Similarity
In this section, we introduce notions of similarity between system states. These will be used in showing nonexistence of a hook, which will yield the contradiction needed for the impossibility proof.
Let ¾ Á and let × ¼ and × ½ be states of . Then × ¼ and × ½ are -similar if: Figure 2 . A hook starting in «.
(1) For every ¾ Á , the state of È is the same in × ¼ and × ½ .
(2) For every ¾ Ã Ê:
1. 
The non-existence of a hook
Now we are ready to prove the absence of hooks. We assume that a hook exists, and we locate in ´ µ two univalent executions of opposite valence that produce -similar ( ¾ Â ) or -similar states ( ¾ Ã ). Lemmas 6 and 7 establish a contradiction.
Lemma 8 ´ µ contains no hooks.
Lemma 5 contradicts Lemma 8. Hence we have derived a contradiction by assuming the negation of Theorem 1. Hence Theorem 1 is established.
-Set Consensus
Our boosting impossibility result concerns consensus implementations. Interestingly, while it is not possible to implement´ · ½ µ -resilient consensus using registers and -resilient atomic objects, this is not the case for the -set consensus problem [7] . In -set consensus, the processes have to agree on at most different values ( -set consensus reduces to consensus when ½ ). Consider a set of -resilient -set consensus services, each one exporting Ñ ports. An algorithm that implements ¼ -resilient ¼ -set consensus works as follows. Take a principal subset of the processes, and divide it into × disjoint groups, each one accessing a different service. Each principal process participates in an execution proposing its input value to its designated service. When it gets a decision back, the process decides on the value and writes it in a shared register. The remaining processes simply wait until at least one principal process writes the value. The values of ¼ and ¼ depend on the size of the principal set, and on the number × of services we divide it into. There is a tradeoff between ¼ and ¼ : if a small number of failures ¼ is tolerated, then a high degree of agreement is achieved, namely a small ¼ . If more failures ¼ must be tolerated, then a lower degree of agreement is achieved, namely a large ¼ . To achieve correctness, we must ensure first that at least one principal process receives a decision from its service and communicates the decision to all, i.e., (1) everyresilient service is connected to · ½ processes, and (2) fewer than × ¡´ · ½ µ principal processes can fail:
Thus, there is at least one service Ë that is not killed, and moreover, there is at least one correct principal process that receives a decision value from Ë and writes the decision in a shared register. Thus, every correct process eventually decides. The number of possible different decision values is at most × ¡ : there are at most different values returned per service; more precisely, at most values per service being accessed by at least processes, and values for a service that is being accessed by processes for . Thus, for a desired overall resilience ¼ , we want the smallest possible ¼ and so we find the smallest integer × that guarantees 
When each available service is wait-free, that is Ñ ½, this algorithm reduces to the one of [13] , and gives a tight bound. As an example, assume that we want to implement a ¼ -resilient Note that the algorithm above uses services that are not connected to all processes. It is known that -resilientset consensus cannot be solved using only reliable registers [3, 14, 18] . We conjecture that -resilient -set consensus cannot be solved using only reliable registers and services that are connected to all processes.
Failure-Oblivious Services
A failure-oblivious service is a generalization of an atomic object. It allows an invocation to trigger multiple processing steps instead of just one Ô Ö ÓÖÑ step. These steps can interleave with processing steps triggered by other invocations, and this makes a failure-oblivious service nonatomic, in general. A failure-oblivious service also allows an invocation to trigger any number of responses, at any endpoints, instead of just a single response at the endpoint of the invocation. The service may also include background processing tasks, not related to any specific endpoint. The key constraint is that no step may depend on explicit knowledge of failure events. In this section, we define the class of failure-oblivious services, give examples, and describe how Theorem 1 can be extended to such services.
-resilient failure-oblivious services
As for atomic objects, we begin by defining a canonical -resilient failure-oblivious service. A canonicalresilient failure-oblivious service is parameterized by Â, , and , which have the same meanings as for canonical atomic objects. Also, in place of the sequential type parameter Ì , the service has a service type parameter Í, which is a tuple Î Î ¼ invs resps ÐÓ AE ½ AE ¾ AE ¿ , where Î and Î ¼ are as before, invs and resps are the respective sets of invocations and responses (which can occur at any endpoint),
ÐÓ is a set of global tasks, and AE ½ AE ¾ AE ¿ are three transition relations.
Here, AE ½ is a total binary relation from invs¢Â ¢Î to (the set of mappings from Â to finite sequences of resps) ¢Î .
It is used to map an invocation at the head of a particular inv-buffer, and the current value for Ú Ð , to a set of results, each of which consists of a new value for Ú Ð and sequences of responses to be added to any or all of the resp-buffers. AE ¾ is a total binary relation from Â ¢ Î to (the set of mappings from Â to finite sequences of resps) ¢Î . It is used to map a particular endpoint and value of Ú Ð to a set of results, defined as above. Finally, AE ¿ is a total binary relation from Î to (the set of mappings from Â to finite sequences of resps) ¢Î . It it used to map a value of Ú Ð to a set of results. The code for a canonical failure-oblivious automaton, showing how these parameters are used, appears in Figure 3 .
Thus, a canonical -resilient failure-oblivious service is allowed to perform rather flexible kinds of processing, both related and unrelated to individual endpoints, as long as processing decisions do not depend on knowledge of occurrence of failure events.
An I/O automaton is an -resilient failure-oblivious service of type Í, endpoint set Â, and index , provided that it implements the canonical -resilient failure oblivious service Ë of type Í for Â and , in the same sense as for atomic objects.
Impossibility of Boosting
Let index set Ã include now the indices of all failureoblivious services. Now the notion of -similarity restricts the states of all registers and of all atomic and failureoblivious services except Ë . We show, in the full version of the paper, that 
General (Failure-Aware) Services
A general, or failure-aware service is a further generalization of a failure-oblivious service. This time, the generalization removes the failure-oblivious constraint, allowing the service's decisions to depend on knowledge of failures of processes connected to the service.
-resilient general services
A canonical -resilient general service is parameterized by Â, , and , which have the same meanings as for canonical failure-oblivious services, and by a service type parameter Í, which is a tuple Î Î ¼ ÒÚ× Ö ×Ô× ÐÓ AE ½ AE ¾ AE ¿ , as for failureoblivious services. This time, however, the domains of AE ½ , AE ¾ , and AE ¿ are invs ¢ Â ¢ Î ¢ ¾ Á , Â ¢ Î ¢ ¾ Á , and Î ¢ ¾ Á , respectively. The final argument, in each case, will be instantiated in the service code with the current failed set.
The only portions of the code that are different from those for failure-oblivious services are the three transition definitions that use the AE ½ , AE ¾ , and AE ¿ (Figure 4) . add ´ µ to end of resp-buffer´ µ
Output:
As for canonical atomic object.
Input:
Ð As for canonical atomic object.
Internal: ÙÑÑÝ £ , ¾ Â As for canonical atomic object. An I/O automaton is an -resilient general service of type Í, endpoint set Â, and index , provided that it implements the canonical -resilient general service Ë of type Í for Â and , in the same sense as for atomic and failureoblivious services.
Internal
Impossibility of Boosting
Our impossibility results for atomic and failure-oblivious services allow arbitrary connections between processes and services. However, it turns out that we can boost the resilience of systems containing failure-aware services, if we allow arbitrary connection patterns:
For example, consider a system that uses wait-free registers and ½-resilient perfect failure detectors. Suppose that every pair of processes shares a ½-resilient ¾-process failure detector. Such a system can implement a wait-free perfect failure detector for all processes as follows: Process just listens to all failure detectors it is connected to and accumulates the set of suspected processes in a dedicated register. Periodically, it outputs its set of suspected processes. Since every perfect failure detector is ½-resilient, the algorithm is wait-free. Using this construction, -resilient consensus, for any , can be implemented using wait-free registers and ½-resilient services.
This boosting is, however, impossible if we assume a system in which -resilient failure-aware services must be connected to all processes, thus, · ½ process failures overall can disable all the failure-aware services. We assume that the system may also contain -resilient failureoblivious services, connected to arbitrary processes. By applying arguments similar to ones presented in Section 4, we can prove boosting to be impossible, i.e., that´ · ½ µ -resilient consensus cannot be solved in such a model. 
Examples
In the full version [1] we show how totally ordered broadcast, and various failure detectors, can be modeled in our framework. An -resilient totally ordered broadcast service can be modeled as an -resilient failure-oblivious service. An invocation inserts a message into a queue (which is the value val), and a -ÓÑÔÙØ action subsequently inserts this message into every output buffer of the service. We use general (failure-aware) services to model failure detectors. Our failure detectors do not provide all the functionality of the standard model [5] : because our failure detectors are automata, they cannot predict future input actions. Thus, our services encompass only realistic failure detectors [8] . Otherwise, modeling failure detectors using general services is straightforward, since general services have access to the set of failed processes.
Conclusions
We have established the impossibility of boosting the resilience of services in a distributed asynchronous system where processes are subject to undetectable stopping failures. Our results can be viewed as a generalization to any number of failures of the impossibility result of Fischer, Lynch and Paterson [9] for ½. While our first result (for atomic objects) can be derived from existing results in the literature, the direct proof that we give is simpler, and is also easily extended to more general services than atomic objects.
